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
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
Intelligence Memorandum

Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations

State Department review completed

NRO REVIEW
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Developments in Sino-Soviet RelationsSummary

Over the past few years, a certain rhythm has become apparent in the cold war between Moscow and Peking. When one side feels its relative position in world affairs is on the upswing, it launches a concerted diplomatic and propaganda campaign against the other. Last fall, for example, when Peking was brimming with confidence after its admission to the UN, the Nixon visit, and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, it took the offensive with sharp attacks on the Soviet policy of detente in Europe. This summer, buoyed by the successful Brezhnev-Nixon meeting, it was the Soviets who assumed the initiative.

In part, the upsurge in Soviet polemics was timed to have impact on the Chinese Party Congress in late August and the nonaligned conference in September. The most important factor, however, was a Chinese refusal to accept a Soviet proposal of mid-June to conclude a treaty of nonaggression. While this proposal was not made public until 24 September, chief Soviet negotiator Ilichev was recalled in mid-July and the Soviet propaganda campaign began in earnest the first week of August.

Both sides have brought their biggest political guns into play; both Leonid Brezhnev and Chou En-lai have personally contributed to the polemics. Most of the charges have been heard before. The Chinese assert that the Soviets are meddling in Asia;

Note: This memorandum is one of a series of reports on Sino-Soviet relations. Comments and queries may be directed to [redacted]

[redacted] both of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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the Soviets contend that the Chinese are meddling in Europe. Each alleges that the other is politically unstable at home, and even questions whether the other has the right to consider itself a socialist country. Moscow is letting it be known that it may call an international conference of communist parties to discuss the China problem.

The intensity of the campaign has forestalled any improvement in relations. The recently signed trade agreement showed no advance in economic relations, and the civil air agreement signed in July has not yet been implemented. The border talks will soon enter their fifth year without any sign of progress, although the border itself remains generally quiet and there have been no major changes in the military forces of either side.

Moscow Wages a War of Polemics


Several weeks before the Communist party congress in Peking, the Soviets began a propaganda campaign against the Chinese that contained some of the sharpest language since the border clashes more than four years ago. The campaign has been highlighted by a series of authoritative editorial articles in major Soviet publications and key statements by Soviet leaders, including party chief Brezhnev, that have directly attacked Chinese leaders and policies. The Soviets have, in effect, challenged Peking's socialist credentials and are working hard to isolate the Chinese politically and ideologically. At least for the time being, any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations is, as a result, virtually impossible.

On 13 July, Soviet Politburo member Suslov, Moscow's principal spokesman on ideology, charged that the Chinese Government was retreating from Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet campaign went into high gear immediately after a meeting in the Crimea on 30 and 31 July of the party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact states and Mongolia. Relations of the Soviet bloc with China were a major subject of discussion at the Crimean meeting. Romanian party chief Ceausescu reportedly spoke out strongly on behalf of China, and several Romanian officials have since claimed, probably with good reason, that the Chinese would have been condemned in the communique if Ceausescu had been willing to go along.

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[REDACTED] the Soviet
Politburo released a communique on the Crimea meeting



Momentaufnahme von der Krim-Konferenz
Die Prawda („Die Wahrheit“) im Hotel!

Snapshot from the Crimean Conference.
Pravda at the hotel.

that called for "collective analysis" and suggested possible high-level interest in an international conference. Three days later, Pravda printed a major editorial article by "I. Aleksandrov (a pseudonym associated in the past with major policy pronouncements on China) that expressed concern over Communist unity and the need for broader policy coordination by Communist states. Aleksandrov's article also pointed to Moscow's willingness to normalize relations with China on the "principles of peaceful coexistence," a formulation that the Soviets have generally applied only to relations between communist and non-communist states. A second article by Aleksandrov, on 26 August, dropped the reference to peaceful coexistence, but warned Peking against trying to induce "certain Communist parties" to refrain from criticizing Chinese policies, an indication that Moscow was willing to cross swords with Romania as well as with China.

On 15 August, Brezhnev weighed in personally at a public rally at Alma-Ata, not far from the Sino-Soviet border. His gloomy assessment of Soviet relations with the Chinese echoed many of Aleksandrov's themes--in marked contrast to his references to Peking more than a year ago, when he was trying to mute Sino-Soviet differences. He argued that the USSR has developed good relations with most Asian countries, but that Peking's "rabid anti-Sovietism" was a major obstacle to stability in the Far East. He also explicitly condemned the "practice of Maoism."

Soviets Orchestrate East European Movement

In addition to Moscow's own efforts against the Chinese, the Soviets have been orchestrating similar polemics by their staunchest allies in Eastern Europe. Every member of the Warsaw Pact except Romania has reprinted one or both of the Aleksandrov articles. To compensate for Romania's independent course at the Crimea conference, the Soviets broadcast summaries of the Aleksandrov articles in Romanian and pointedly--

if not accurately--reminded Bucharest that the Crimean meeting showed the socialist countries' "determination always to coordinate their actions."

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The Polish press also criticized the Chinese leadership and concluded that Maoist ideology was directed against the interests of the socialist community. This pattern of attacks by politburos and press was repeated in Bulgaria on 8 August, when the Bulgarian Politburo warned against "opportunism of left and right" and the media followed up with unconditional support for concerted action against the Chinese. East Germany and Hungary did not disseminate anti-Chinese comment strictly in the context of the Crimea conference, but they have both criticized Chinese policies and ideology.

Mongolia, too, joined the campaign. A Mongolian central newspaper on 3 September accused Chinese citizens of crossing the Sino-Mongolian border, "deliberately penetrating Mongolian territory as deep as 15 to 20 kilometers," and using Chinese citizens in Mongolia for "hostile anti-Mongolian activities." "Chilling Maoist winds from the East," the article said, are trying to seize the leadership of the Third World and slow down Brezhnev's efforts to relax international tension.

It is most unusual for Mongolia to enter the Sino-Soviet dispute with specific charges of this kind. The Soviets showed they endorsed (if not inspired) the article by devoting a fourth of their news weekly, New Times, to a reprint of the Mongolian broadside. The article, which was published on the eve of the nonaligned conference in Algeria, was certainly intended to undercut Peking's contention

that it is a genuine friend of Third World nations. More important in terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the article may be intended to stir up Sino-Mongolian bitterness, something the Chinese have been trying to avoid in recent months.

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Another World Communist Conference

Clearly the Soviets are edging toward an authoritative declaration that will put China beyond the socialist pale. The Aleksandrov articles carry strong hints of this, and numerous articles in Soviet and East European newspapers have openly challenged Peking's socialist credentials. Over the last six months there has been growing evidence that Moscow may be contemplating another international communist conference to read China out of the movement. Authoritative reporting on the Crimean meeting suggests that Brezhnev himself wants to keep the idea alive.

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Romanian and Chinese officials have been actively spreading the word about a conference, probably in the hope of heading it off.

The tentativeness with which the Kremlin is approaching a conference nevertheless suggests that the Soviet leaders are aware of the serious problems it would involve. The Romanians and the Yugoslavs, the French and the Italians, and the North Koreans and North Vietnamese would certainly be opposed, and many others would be reluctant to stand up and be counted. At the last international conference in 1969, more than a third of the parties attending refused to join Brezhnev in attacking the Maoists.

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There is no hard evidence that Moscow has taken the complex, practical steps--such as letters to foreign parties explaining the need for a conference--that would be essential in preparing for a new meeting. The signs of Soviet interest in a conference may at this stage be no more than a threat against China and its supporters, not an indication that a decision has been made to convene a conference.

The Chinese Response

Peking media were slow to respond to the Soviet barrage, but on 20 August NCNA ran a long article commemorating the 5th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia which set the theme for the Chinese counteroffensive that is still underway. The article portrayed Moscow as an aggressive, unpredictable force in world affairs. It stressed that Moscow had not renounced the "hegemonic" policy which led to the invasion and that the invasion, as well as the massive internal purges that followed, clearly indicated that Moscow might again interfere in the affairs of other countries. This attack was followed closely by another article which challenged Moscow to reconcile its proclaimed adherence to a non-use-of-force policy with its insistence that military force could be employed if an "invitation" were received from the host government to intervene. Both articles reflected Peking's increased apprehension over the Soviet military threat to China and its concern over possible Soviet efforts to influence the direction of internal Chinese politics.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Chou En-lai's report to the party congress on 24 August labeled Moscow China's number one enemy. Warning that the Chinese people should be vigilant against a "surprise attack" by "social imperialism," Chou picked up the theme of the NCNA articles by calling the USSR a "fascist dictatorship" engaged in an aggressive militaristic policy. In condemning Lin Biao

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as a Soviet "super spy," Chou gave the most direct indication possible of just how sensitive Peking is to either direct Soviet interference in Chinese politics or to those within China who might advocate improved relations with Moscow on anything approaching Moscow's terms. Chou's report did mention a possible improvement in state-to-state relations, but this was probably little more than an attempt to illustrate Chinese "reasonableness."

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Following the Congress, Peking broadened its propaganda attack by originating or replaying articles extremely critical of Soviet policy in virtually every part of the world. With an obvious eye on the trend toward detente in Western Europe, Peking quoted Defense Secretary Schlesinger's statements that the "existence of detente has not affected Soviet behavior at all" and that Moscow "sees no conflict between an atmosphere of detente and improving its active forces." NCNA accused Moscow of "expansionist moves" in the Persian Gulf aimed at gaining control of this "highly strategic area" and its vast oil reserves, quoted Western news reports that Moscow is stepping up its naval and air activities in the Caribbean, and again called attention to Moscow's refusal to sign the protocol on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Peking's broad and acerbic assault on Moscow has not been accompanied by any increased efforts to accelerate and better relations with the US. In fact, some bilateral exchanges have been delayed and postponed, and an element of caution has emerged that probably reflects both internal differences over US policy and disappointment at the outcome of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. Chou's report to the party congress described relations with the US in measured terms, noting simply that relations "had improved somewhat" and implying at times that the new relationship with the US was only a temporary tactical choice between the lesser of two evils. He also expressed concern

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over "collusion" between Moscow and the US. While Chou confidently predicted that such collusion would inevitably be eclipsed by continuing global "competition," Chinese media since the party congress have mixed commentaries stressing Soviet-US differences with others pointing up the dangers of cooperation between Washington and Moscow.

One such article accused Moscow of using the Soviet-US agreement on the prevention of nuclear war to proclaim the successes of its "peace diplomacy," while still carrying out "nuclear intimidation and blackmail against the people of various countries." NCNA also replayed a caustic article from a Japanese leftist journal entitled "The Illusion and Truth of the US-Soviet Summit--the Real Features of Soviet Social Imperialism." Brezhnev's goal in the summit talks, the article argued, was to "strengthen the hegemonic rule of the two superpowers;" the article also warned that world issues should not be settled by the "wisdom" of the superpowers. Similar themes were evident in a theoretical article in Red Flag which reflected extreme sensitivity to Brezhnev's boast that the climate of the world is determined by the Soviet Union and the US. In one of the most defensive statements in the piece, the article asserts that the US and the USSR "certainly cannot determine the fate of the world" since the "people and the people alone are the motive force in the making of world history."

Running through the Red Flag article and many other recent Chinese pronouncements and propaganda is a thread of discontent--an uneasy feeling that the opening to the US has not resulted in as many benefits vis-a-vis the Soviets as had been expected. In addition, the Chinese may be somewhat frustrated because there appears to be no alternative to the present policy.

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
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Moscow in the Wake of the Chinese Party Congress

Since the Party Congress, the Soviets in private have sought to play down any anxieties they may have about the impact of the congress on current Sino-Soviet relations. In conversations with US Embassy officers on 30 August and 11 September, Soviet officials took the line that the congress marked a victory for Chou En-lai and implied that dealing with Chou was better than having to deal with an unknown quantity. They avoided mentioning that Chou's report to the congress pulled few punches in attacking Moscow and contained a positive assessment of Sino-US detente. Instead, Viktor Trifonov--a China specialist in the Foreign Ministry--professed to regard the fact that Chou had "left the door open" to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations as a positive development. Trifonov denied that the USSR had any intention of declaring that China is no longer a socialist country.

The Soviets have thus shown they are aware that even the appearance of a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations could be exploited by the US. They have also sought to encourage the US to assume a cautious attitude toward China. Trifonov argued that the Chinese party congress had touched off a new round of political infighting and warned that Peking could turn against the US. Chou, according to Trifonov, was quite capable of shifting Peking's "hostile attitude overnight" from one super-power to the other super-power. Although he claimed to see Chou's authority unimpaired at this juncture, he pointedly



Meanwhile, Back in the Outside World...

noted that the prospects for continuing Chou's policies are not bright once he passes from the scene.

The Soviet central press has also been more restrained since the Chinese Congress. For the first two weeks, the Soviets made no editorial comment in their news media, merely providing a roundup of foreign commentary. It was not until 11 September that the Soviets directly commented on the congress, and even then they did not address the problem of Maoism or Peking's status within the world communist movement. Instead, the congress was passed off as a "new round...in the struggle for political influence" that solved nothing. The only Soviet discussion of the foreign policy aspects of the congress so far appeared in a New Times article of 14 September that charged the Chinese with opposing detente and carrying "anti-Sovietism" to the "point of hysteria." The article declared flatly that the congress revealed Peking's attempt to divert China from the path of socialism and thus reopened the subject of China's status in the socialist movement.

Relations at a Virtual Standstill

One result of the heated exchange over the past two months is that Sino-Soviet relations are practically at an impasse. The Soviet ambassador to Peking returned there two weeks ago after being absent from his post for the past three months, and Moscow's chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, left Peking on 18 July.

[redacted] TASS announced that he went home "on official business." This was the first time that the Soviets had ever reported Ilichev's departure for consultation; the publicity suggested that the Soviets wanted to create the impression that some development--either positive or negative--had occurred during the talks.

Speaking in Tashkent on 24 September, Brezhnev in fact lambasted the Chinese for failing to respond

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to a Soviet offer in June to conclude a treaty of nonaggression. Brezhnev explained that the treaty contained the "undertaking of the sides not to attack each other on land, on sea, and in air with any types of weapons and also not to threaten such an attack." Ilichev's return was to put pressure on the Chinese and to report that he had failed to convince the Chinese to accept the Soviet offer.

The two sides did manage to conclude their annual trade agreement on 1 August, but negotiations took more than three months, and trade between the two countries in 1973 is expected to remain at about the same level as in 1972.

The major Soviet export will be about a dozen AN-24 aircraft

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other major Soviet export will be large turbogenerators which will probably have to be installed by Soviet technicians. In addition, Moscow will provide trucks, machinery and spare parts, and iron and steel products. Chinese exports will be the usual mix of foodstuffs, textiles, and consumer goods--primarily to supply the Soviet Far East.

The implementation of the protocol to the Civil Air Agreement that was signed on 16 July after three months of difficult negotiations may be delayed. Soviet officials indicated to the US Embassy that there were problems because the Chinese had not yet designated an alternate airport capable of handling the long-range IL-62s that would be used in an upgraded Moscow-Peking air service. The Soviets would settle for Shanghai's international airport. The Chinese are unwilling to agree to this, although the airport is already used by Air France and Ethiopian Airlines.

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Border Remains Quiet

Despite the political tensions, there have been no major incidents along the Sino-Soviet border, and the military situation in general has not changed appreciably over the summer months.

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Soviet Campaign for Asian Collective Security

Moscow's anti-Chinese polemics have been accompanied by renewed attention to the proposal for Asian collective security that Brezhnev first made four years ago. Last December Brezhnev sought to meet a key Asian objection to the proposal when he publicly proclaimed that it was not aimed at China. In recent months, however, the Soviets have been calling attention to the similarities between the Bandung principles of 1955 and their own proposal in the hope of showing that Peking, which endorsed the former, is now out of step in Asia.

Recent Soviet propaganda about collective security has emphasized the importance of Japan and India--China's major rivals--to Asian security. Neither the Japanese nor the Indians have endorsed the Soviet idea, but Moscow may be engaging in some advance preparation for a visit by Prime Minister Tanaka to the USSR early next month and a visit by Soviet leaders to India later this year. Both Tanaka and Prime Minister Gandhi can expect to come under considerable pressure to offer the kind of endorsement that only the Iranians have been willing to make thus far. Tokyo, however, has already expressed the view publicly that China would not take part in a Soviet-sponsored system and that any system that excluded China would be meaningless. New Delhi's position vis-a-vis the Soviets is a more sensitive one, and the Indians probably will seek a more delicate way to put off the USSR.

Even Tehran is trying to back off from its endorsement of collective security earlier this year when Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Iran. During Prime Minister Hoveyda's trip to Moscow in August, the communique winding up the meeting noted that all countries in Asia must be included if collective security in Asia is to be realized.

Moscow's support for collective security is more than a ploy against the Chinese. The Soviets

are interested in reducing Western influence in the Far East and in providing a framework for expansion of their own influence. Moscow also wants to confirm existing Asian frontiers by gaining endorsement for the principle of inviolability of frontiers, a principle which is relevant to Soviet territorial disputes with Japan as well as with China. Moscow is not likely to press for any Asian equivalent of a conference on European security any time soon but the Soviets would need only a few Asian endorsements of the idea to show the Chinese that Moscow's policy of detente can be successful even in Peking's backyard.

The Chinese, of course, are extremely sensitive to Soviet ideas for an Asian security system. The main focus of their counterattack has been on undercutting Moscow's portrayal of itself as a peace-loving, detente-oriented power. The Soviets' collective security scheme has most recently been condemned as an effort to fill the void left by the withdrawal of most US forces from Asia and as a new "containment" policy aimed against China. As evidence, the Chinese point to expanding Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Cambodian port of Kompong Song. During his recent toast to visiting French President Pompidou, Chou En-lai was apparently referring to the security plan when he condemned Moscow for holding "nuclear weapons in one hand and treaties of peace and security in the other."

Competition on Other Fronts: France

The joint communique issued at the close of Pompidou's visit suggests that the Chinese tried and failed to draw the French into the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although the communique stated that China and France held "broadly identical views," unity was expressed only on non-controversial subjects. On Europe, the area where Peking probably concentrated most of its attention, Sino-French views diverged

sharply. Peking's section of the communique stressed its support for a strengthening of Europe militarily through greater unity; Paris' formulation observed that France was pursuing "a policy aimed at detente." And while Peking apparently pushed Paris to condemn any power that sought hegemony in Europe, the communique noted only that the two sides opposed "hegemony of any type." Even in areas like nuclear defense and disarmament, where Chinese and French views are very similar, the communique went no further than to note that these subjects had been discussed.

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Undoubtedly aware that he had arrived in Peking during an extremely strained period in Sino-Soviet relations, Pompidou bent over backwards to avoid giving the appearance of taking sides in the feud. This is clear not only from the communique, but also from Pompidou's explicit statement in his press conference of 14 September that the visit was not aimed at the USSR or any other country. Given Peking's goals at the summit, it is not surprising that NCNA simply did not report Pompidou's statement. Despite the red carpet treatment given Pompidou throughout his visit, there is little doubt that Peking was gravely disappointed that the president of China's "oldest friend in Western Europe" was not more receptive to Chinese views.

The Japanese Triangle

Since March of this year one of the primary irritants in Sino-Japanese relations has been Tokyo's decision to move toward cooperating with the Soviets in the development of the Tyumen oil fields. After months of loud opposition to the project, the Chinese have begun to take a much milder line, perhaps because they have despaired of altering Tokyo's position, perhaps because they have decided that prolonged opposition might be counterproductive. At

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any rate, by the end of August the Chinese were saying that the best solution would be for both the US and Japan to cooperate with the Soviets in the projects, apparently because they believe that US involvement would dilute any leverage that Moscow might gain over Tokyo as a result of a massive Japanese investment in Tyumen.

Ironically, just as Peking was moderating its opposition to the project, Moscow began to throw up serious obstacles of its own.

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As if this were not enough, Moscow has been extremely abrupt with Tokyo in arranging for a state visit by Prime Minister Tanaka to the USSR. Soviet officials summarily postponed the trip earlier this summer and since then have been so uncooperative that the two sides have yet to agree even on an agenda. Prime Minister Tanaka had hoped to be able to announce during his visit that some agreement had been reached on the Tyumen project or that there had been some movement on the question of the Soviet-held Northern Territories; the prospect of either occurring is now extremely bleak.

Peking must be pleased by the backward movement in Soviet-Japanese relations since it means that Japan's leverage with regard to bilateral Sino-Japanese issues is now more restricted than before. Thus, Peking is continuing to press the Japanese for a civil aviation agreement, which would in effect enlist Tokyo's aid in a further downgrading of Nationalist China's status. This and other bilateral treaties remain stalemated, and the Japanese find themselves in the frustrating position of being unable to use Sino-Soviet competition to advance their own ends.

The Korean Angle

In North Korea, the Chinese have been quick to exploit Moscow's decision to invite Seoul to the World University Games, a bitter pill for Pyongyang to swallow. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the North Korean regime soon after it had soundly condemned Moscow for the invitation, Peking lavished considerable attention on Pyongyang.

A friendship delegation headed by Central Committee Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng traveled to Pyongyang and was received by Kim Il-sung. Chou En-lai, along with three of the four other Vice Chairmen, attended a reception at the Korean Embassy, and People's Daily ran a long editorial extending China's "warmest congratulations and loftiest salute" to the North Koreans. The editorial, as well as a speech given by Li Te-sheng in Pyongyang, reiterated Peking's support for Kim Il-sung's program for the reunification of the peninsula, denounced the "two Koreas" approach, and called for the withdrawal of US troops.

A display of good will is not unusual for Peking on the special anniversaries of its oldest ally in Asia, but the broad, high-level attention paid to the event this year suggests that Peking is making special efforts to shore up its relationship with the North Koreans now that China is coming under increasing propaganda attack from the USSR. As late as early summer North Korean leaders were expressing discontent over their relations with Peking and praising Moscow, and Peking is obviously trying to tilt the balance back toward China.

The Chinese are also out in front of the Soviets in advocating North Korea's interests at the UN. In New York last week in private talks with US Ambassador Scali, Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua emphasized Peking's support for the Algerian resolution on the Korean

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question. China is again co-sponsoring the resolution which this year--for the first time--specifically refers to the termination of the United Nations Command. Huang said that both UNCURK and the UN Command are "stumbling blocks" to the unification of Korea and implied that UN membership for both Koreas would lead to the perpetual division of the peninsula, a position that directly parallels that of North Korea. Huang, rejecting the US view that a UN presence was needed to enforce the armistice in Korea, predicted that "wide controversies" would arise when the Algerian and the US resolutions on the subject were placed before the UN General Assembly. After an initial round of low-key lobbying last year on behalf of the Algerian resolution, the Chinese accepted the negative decision of the General Assembly without making a major issue of its differences with the US on the question. This year the Chinese will probably feel compelled to press somewhat harder, though stopping short of an all-out confrontation.

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